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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1987 Term 
Robert E. Riggs* 
Michael R. Moss** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article is the second annual survey of Supreme Court 
voting behavior presented by the BYU JouRNAL OF PuBLIC LAW. 1 
Like its predecessor, it examines the positions taken by individual jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court on selected issues and catego-
ries of cases decided during the immediately preceding term. This sur-
vey of the 1987 term examines several categories of issues that occur 
each term with some frequency and which may provide indicators of 
the justices' views on important questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion and individual rights. A federalism category, added this year, in-
creases the number of issues tables from eight to nine. A tenth table, 
also new this year, tabulates "swing voting" on the Court. This table 
counts the number of times each member of the Court voted with the 
majority in some thirty-one decisions that could have been reversed had 
any member of the majority coalition voted instead with the minority. 
The issue categories are as follows: 
1) Civil controversies in which a state, one of its officials, or a 
political subdivision is opposed by a private party. 
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one 
of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private party. 
3) State criminal cases. 
4) Federal criminal cases. 
5) First amendment issues of speech, association, and free ex-
ercise of religion. 
6) Equal protection issues. 
7) Statutory civil rights claims. 
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I. For the initial survey see Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. 
PuB. L. IS (1988). 
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8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, standing, justiciability 
and similar matters. 
9) Federalism issues. 
Tables 1-9 present voting data for these nine issue categories. Ta-
ble 10 deals with the swing-vote cases. 
Each of the nine issue categories, in theory at least, taps atti-
tudes of the justices toward two super-issues having relevance for 
most Supreme Court decision-making-individual rights and judi-
cial restraint. A claim of individual rights, whether based on stat-
ute or a constitutional guarantee, usually finds the claimant op-
posed by the government or by a relatively powerful social group 
or organization. Judicial restraint is normally identified with def-
erence to legislatures as the policy-making branch of government, 
respect for precedent, avoidance of constitutional questions when 
narrower grounds for decision are available, avoidance of unneces-
sary decisions, and respect for the framers' intent (when ascertain-
able) in construing constitutional text. 2 Respect for the role of 
states within the federal system might also be associated with judi-
cial restraint, for example, when deciding whether to strike down 
a state law under the preemption doctrine. 
Judicial restraint and concern for individual rights are not 
opposite poles of a single attitudinal dimension. Concern for prece-
dent, avoidance of constitutional questions and unnecessary deci-
sions, deference to states, and even search for the framers' intent 
could cut either way with respect to individual rights. Neverthe-
less, there is a good deal of tension between the two. Deference to 
legislatures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, es-
pecially one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental ac-
tion. Emphasis upon the framers' intent can mean unwillingness 
to read new individual rights into the Constitution. Reluctance to 
exercise federal court jurisdiction may leave the decision to state 
courts, with their possible bias in favor of actions by state govern-
ments. In the voting tabulations that follow, most of the data sup-
porting an inference of judicial restraint, or the lack of it, will also 
be consistent, respectively, with a narrow or a broad view of indi-
vidual rights. 
2. For an extensive discussion of judicial restraint, see Lamb, judicial Restraint on the Su-
preme Court, in SUPREME CoURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 7 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 
1982). 
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II. THE VOTING RECORD 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Rehnquist 19 9 67.9 71.8 
White 15 13 53.6 43.6 
Scalia 15 14 51.7 64.1 
Kennedy 7 7 50.0 
O'Connor 14 14 50.0 64.1 
Blackmun 13 16 44.8 36.8 
Stevens 11 18 37.9 46.2 
Brennan 10 19 34.5 33.3 
Marshall 10 19 34.5 30.8 
Majority 15 14 51.7 53.9 
TABLE 2 
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
O'Connor 26 8 76.5 75.0 
White 24 9 72.7 87.1 
Scalia 20 12 62.5 82.8 
Rehnquist 21 13 61.8 90.6 
Kennedy 7 5 58.3 
Stevens 19 15 55.9 50.0 
Blackmun 17 17 50.0 53.1 
Brennan 15 18 45.5 43.8 
Marshall 15 19 44.1 46.9 
Majority 21 13 61.8 68.8 
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TABLE 3 
STATE CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Rehnquist 14 5 73.7 87.9 
Kennedy 7 3 70.0 
Scalia 12 7 63.2 75.8 
O'Connor 11 7 61.1 75.8 
White 9 10 47.4 81.8 
Blackmun 5 14 26.3 30.3 
Stevens 4 15 21.1 21.2 
Brennan 1 18 5.3 3.0 
Marshall 18 5.3 3.0 
Majority 8 11 47.4 60.6 
TABLE 4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Rehnquist 12 2 85.7 80.0 
White 12 2 85.7 90.0 
Blackmun 11 3 78.6 30.0 
Kennedy 5 2 71.4 
O'Connor 10 4 71.4 90.0 
Scalia 9 5 64.3 70.0 
Stevens 9 5 64.3 40.0 
Brennan 5 8 38.5 0.0 
Marshall 4 10 28.6 0.0 
Majority 11 3 78.6 60.0 
59) SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR 63 
TABLE 5 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, 
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term o/o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Brennan 11 2 84.6 91.7 
Marshall 11 2 84.6 91.7 
Blackmun 9 4 69.2 72.7 
Kennedy 4 2 66.7 
Stevens 7 7 50.0 50.0 
Scalia 5 8 38.5 36.4 
White 4 9 30.8 41.7 
O'Connor 3 10 23.1 45.5 
Rehnquist 2 10 16.7 16.7 
Majority 7 7 50.0 58.3 
TABLE 6 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term o/o Votes for Rights Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Blackmun 4 4 50.0 57.1 
Brennan 3 5 37.5 71.4 
Marshall 3 5 37.5 71.4 
Kennedy 1 2 33.3 
Stevens 2 5 28.6 33.3 
O'Connor 7 12.5 42.9 
Rehnquist 7 12.5 14.3 
Scalia 7 12.5 14.3 
White 7 12.5 28.6 
Majority 1 7 12.5 14.3 
64 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 3 
TABLE 7 
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term % Votes for Rights Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Blackmun 7 1 87.5 84.6 
Brennan 7 87.5 84.6 
Marshall 7 87.5 84.6 
Stevens 7 1 87.5 61.5 
Kennedy 2 1 66.7 
White 5 3 62.5 61.5 
Scalia 4 3 57.1 38.5 
O'Connor 3 4 42.9 30.8 
Rehnquist 3 5 37.5 38.5 
Majority 6 2 75.0 53.9 
TABLE 8 
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Justice Number of Votes, 1987 Term % Votes for Rights Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1987 1986 Term 
Term 
Brennan 27 16 62.8 60.7 
Blackmun 25 18 58.1 64.3 
Marshall 24 18 57.1 57.1 
Stevens 24 18 57.1 71.4 
Kennedy 9 7 56.3 
White 22 21 51.2 71.4 
Rehnquist 20 22 47.6 67.9 
O'Connor 18 24 42.9 64.3 
Scalia 15 26 36.6 61.5 
Majority 24 19 55.8 60.7 
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TABLE 9 
FEDERALISM CASES 
Number of Votes, 1987 Term 
For State Claim For Federal Claim 
7 6 
7 6 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
4 8 
3 6 
4 9 
4 9 
5 8 
TABLE 10 
I % Votes for State 
1987 
53.8 
53.8 
46.2 
46.2 
46.2 
33.3 
33.3 
30.8 
30.8 
38.5 
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN 
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES 
1987 TERM 
Justice Number of Votes with Total %Votes 
Majority Votes Cast With 
5-4 5-3 4-3 In Close Majority 
Votes Votes Votes Total Cases 
White 12 10 2 24 31 77.4 
Kennedy 10 0 0 10 14 71.4 
Rehnquist 10 9 2 21 30 70.0 
Scalia 8 10 2 20 30 66.7 
O'Connor 9 10 1 20 31 64.5 
Stevens 6 11 2 19 31 61.3 
Blackmun 5 8 14 31 45.2 
Brennan 5 6 12 30 40.0 
Marshall 5 6 12 31 38.7 
Majority 14 14 3 31 31 
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Ill. ANALYSIS 
A list of cases included in each of the ten tables, and the criteria 
governing their selection, are presented in an appendix to this article. 
Each case was read and coded by three readers, and differences in clas-
sification were discussed in order to achieve consensus on the appropri-
ate classification. The result undoubtedly falls somewhat short of per-
fect validity and reliability, but we believe that other readers using the 
same coding criteria would arrive at substantially the same results. 
Still, not all difficult problems of judgment are eliminated by the crite-
ria. In Hicks v. Feiock, 3 for example, five justices voted to remand for a 
state court determination whether a contempt proceeding for nonpay-
ment of child support was civil or criminal. Three justices in dissent 
were convinced the proceeding was civil and would have reversed out-
right. Since the state was petitioner, all eight in some sense voted in 
favor of the state. The case nevertheless was coded three votes for the 
state and five for the defendant in order to reflect the substantial differ-
ence in viewpoint between the majority and minority positions. Most of 
the decisions fit with little distortion into a dichotomous classification of 
"for" or "against," but some, like Hicks, leave room for legitimate dif-
ference of opinion how a particular justice's "vote" should be coded. 
With that caveat, a brief discussion of the statistical tables may be 
helpful. The first four tables deal with categories which are for the 
most part mutually exclusive: no case coded in one of the categories is 
included in any of the other three. By definition, a case would not be 
categorized as both civil and criminal," nor would a case on appeal 
involve a simultaneous federal and state prosecution. A civil suit having 
a private party on one side and both a state and a federal agency on the 
other is not inconceivable, but no case of that nature was decided by 
full opinion during the 1987 term. 11 In contrast, the last five tables do 
3. 108 S. Ct. 1423 (1988) (Kennedy, J. not participating). 
4. In Hicks, 108 S. Ct. at 1423, the issue, as noted above, was whether to treat the contempt 
proceeding as civil or criminal. The case is coded as criminal because it was decided in the lower 
courts on that assumption, although the state attorney argued to the contrary and the Supreme 
Court remanded for the state court to address that issue directly. 
5. In Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988), an Arizona official was a named de-
fendimt along with federal officials in a suit by recipients of disability payments. The action was 
predicated upon Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Bureau of Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
which creates liability only for federal officials. Although rejecting the claim, the Court was will-
ing to assume, arguendo, that the Arizona official was in some sense an agent of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services. The officials were defended by the Solicitor General of the United 
States, with no participation of record by the Arizona Attorney General's office. The case is in-
cluded only in Table 2. 
F.E.R.C. v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988), and Public Serv. 
Comm'n v. Martin Exploration Management Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988), are companion cases 
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not comprise mutually exclusive categories of cases. The categories are 
based on issues rather than parties, which means that a case raising 
more than one relevant issue will be included in more than one cate-
gory. For example, an action by a private party against a state might 
conceivably raise issues pertaining to the first amendment, equal pro-
tection, statutory civil rights, jurisdiction, and federalism. If so, it would 
be included in each of the last four tables, as well as in Table 1 (state/ 
private civil controversies). The voting alignment would not necessarily 
be the same for each issue.6 In a few instances a case is coded more 
than once in the same issue category. This occurs when the case raises 
two or more distinct issues in a single category and the issues are de-
cided by differing voting alignments. 7 
Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party 
Table 1 lists summary percentages and the number of times each 
justice voted for and against the state government in a civil dispute with 
a private litigant. Table 2 gives the same kind of data for civil disputes 
between the federal government and private parties. While the variety 
of cases included in these tables defies any neat summary, a consistent 
record of voting for the government position might be presumed to indi-
cate a posture of judicial restraint (leaving decisions of the political 
branches in place unless there is a clear reason for deciding otherwise) 
and a narrow view of the scope of individual rights. Inspection of the 
judicial rankings in Table 1 tends to confirm that presumption, based 
on what is generally known or believed about individual members of 
the Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and 
Scalia usually the most supportive of the government party and Justices 
Marshall and Brennan the least supportive. On the federal scale for the 
1987 term, the Chief Justice moved toward the middle of the ranking, a 
matter which is discussed below.6 The Kennedy vote during his first 
term on the High Court is of some interest also. He participated in less 
decided in a single opinion. A federal agency is a party in one case, a state agency in the other. 
They are listed as separate cases in the reports and are so treated in this analysis with one in-
cluded in Table 1, the other in Table 2. 
6. E.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (raised 
first amendment, equal protection, and jurisdiction issues; the voting was unanimous on each is-
sue); Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988) (rejected an equal protection claim unanimously, but 
struck down a District of Columbia embassy picketing ordinance on first amendment grounds by a 
divided vote). 
7. For example, in Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988), the Court rejected one of petition-
ers' first amendment claims but upheld another. Thus the case accounts for two issues in Table 5. 
If both issues had been decided in the same way by an identical vote, the case would have been 
treated as raising a single first amendment issue. 
8. See infra page 76. 
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than half of the Court's decisions, but his score for those cases placed 
him precisely at the midpoint of both scales-close to the position occu-
pied the previous term by his predecessor Justice Powell. 
Comparison of the percentage figures in the two right hand col-
umns indicates that the rankings at the extremes have remained fairly 
constant from the 1986 to the 1987 terms, except for Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's move toward the middle on Table 2. The percentages like-
wise show only modest differences between the two terms for the state 
table, especially at the extremes. The federal government table, how-
ever, shows a marked decline in percentage support for the government 
among justices at the upper end of the scale. The support score dropped 
fifteen percentage points for Justice White, twenty-one points for Jus-
tice Scalia, and twenty-nine points for the Chief Justice. 
Examination of the state cases in which the justices at the ex-
tremes voted contrary to their expected pro- or anti-government lean-
ings tends to confirm prevailing assumptions about their conservative or 
liberal orientations. Seven of the nine Rehnquist votes against govern-
ment were unanimous, or at least without any opposing vote, which 
suggests a case against the government strong enough to transcend ideo-
logical bias. An eighth case, Honig v. Doe, 9 probably should be in-
cluded in that category as well since the two dissenters, Scalia and 
O'Connor, objected on mootness grounds and expressly did not address 
the merits of the case. The one remaining Rehnquist vote against the 
state came in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 10 in which 
the financial survival of a large public utility company was at stake in a 
rate dispute with the state of Mississippi. The Chief Justice found the 
state's action was preempted, which, apart from the legal merits, had 
the effect of preferring vested interests of shareholders to the interests of 
consumer ratepayers. 
The Brennan and Marshall votes in favor of the state are similarly 
explicable in terms consistent with the underlying assumptions. Five of 
their ten "unexpected" votes occurred in unanimous decisions, and all 
five votes were reasonably consistent with a liberal social philosophy. 
Two of the votes had the effect of remedying alleged discrimination 
against minorities11 and women/2 two upheld state regulation in the 
interest of consumers;13 and one validated a state tax on the mail order 
9. I 08 S. Ct. 592 (1988). 
10. 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988). 
II. Marino v. Ortiz, 108 S. Ct. 586 (1988) and Costello v. New York City Police Dept., 108 
S. Ct. 586 (1988) (companion cases). 
12. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). 
13. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., I 08 S. Ct. 1350 (1988); 
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Martin Exploration & Mining Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988). 
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catalog business. 14 The "unexpected" pro-government votes by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall in the five cases decided by a divided court are 
for the most part similarly explicable in terms of a liberal orientation 
or a "favor-the-underdog" philosophy. The pro-Mississippi position in 
Mississippi Power and Light Co. 15 preferred consumer interests over 
shareholder interests. A vote for the state in Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. 
Miller16 was a vote for a workmen's compensation claim. In Pennell v. 
City of San Jose, 17 the city's cause was rent control. Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Mississippi18 involved a suit by a large oil company to establish 
its claim to certain tidelands subject to the jurisdiction of the state. Only 
one vote by Justices Brennan and Marshall in this category was out of 
character in the sense of supporting the government against a claim of 
individual rights violation. In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 19 both 
justices agreed that the city was not liable because no municipal policy 
had led to the retaliation alleged by plaintiff, a former city employee. 
Only Justice Stevens dissented from that decision. Although concurring 
in the judgment, Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun) argued that the Court had set too high a constitutional 
threshold for finding municipal liability. 
In Table 2, civil cases involving a federal government party, both 
the rankings and the percentages for justices at the low end of the scale 
show only modest change from the 1986 term. As expected, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall voted most often against the government, and 
most of their votes in favor of the federal government are readily ex-
plained. Ten of Justice Brennan's votes20 and eleven of Justice Mar-
shall's pro-government votes21 occurred in decisions without dissent. In 
two of the remaining pro-government decisions a vote for the govern-
ment was a vote for worker rights.22 In two other such decisions, both 
14. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 108 S. Ct. 1619 (1988). 
15. 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988). 
16. 108 S. Ct. 1704 (1988). 
17. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988). 
18. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988). 
19. 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988). 
20. I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988); Huffman v. Western Nuclear Inc., 108 S. 
Ct. 2087 (1988); F.D.l.C. v. Mallen, 108 S. Ct. 1780 (1988); F.E.R.C. v. Martin Exploration 
Management Co., 108 S. Ct. 1765 (1988); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 108 S. Ct. 1179 
(1988); N.L.R.B. v. United Food & Commercial Workers' Union, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987); Arkan-
sas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 S. Ct. 971 (1988); I.N.S. v. Abudu, 108 S. Ct. 904 (1988); 
Bowen v. Galbreath, 108 S. Ct. 892 (1988); Langley v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 396 
(1987). 
Justice Brennan did not participate in Church of Scientology v. I.R.S., 108 S. Ct. 271 (1987). 
21. See cases cited supra note 20, and Church of Scientology of California v. I.R.S., 108 S. 
Ct. 271 (1987). 
22. E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988) (upholding jurisdiction 
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justices cast their votes for consumers in upholding United States cus-
toms regulations that permitted the importation of foreign goods bear-
ing American trademarks without the consent of the American trade-
mark holders. 23 Justices Brennan and Marshall cast votes on opposing 
sides in only one case included in Table 2.24 
For the justices at the top of the scale in Table 2, the contrast with 
the 1986 term probably reflects something more than mere differences 
in the types of fact situations litigated. At least Justice Rehnquist's shift 
toward the center seems more than the random variation one might 
expect from term to term.u Some of his voting behavior may be expli-
cable in terms of an underlying conservative philosophy that dictates, 
on particular facts, a vote against the government even though a pro-
government vote is his normal leaning. Of his eight votes26 against the 
government in non-unanimous decisions, four were in some respect 
"pro-business" positions, cons~;rvative in the sense of protecting vested 
interests. 27 Of the other four, however, three of his positions were 
clearly on the individual rights side of the ledger,28 and one was at least 
of E.E.O.C. because filing of sex discrimination charge was timely); McLaughlin v. Richland 
Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. 1677 (1988) (Brennan, J., Marshall,]. and Blackmun,]. dissenting from 
majority decision more favorable to employers than to employees in civil action to enforce the Fair 
Labor Standards Act). 
23. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). The Court upheld two govern-
ment regulations and invalidated one. The voting on the issues is tabulated as two decisions in 
Table 2. Business organizations were ranged on both sides of the issue, but one effect of the 
Brennan/Marshall vote was to allow American consumers greater access to foreign imports-a 
position consistent with their "under-dog" philosophies. 
24. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268 
(1988). All but Justice Marshall agreed that the U.S. Catholic Conference had the right to chal-
lenge the district court's subject matter jurisdiction as a defense to a civil contempt citation issued 
for failure to comply with a discovery order in a suit to which the Conference was not a party. In 
the instant case, the United States, though a respondent, supported the petitioners' position. The 
underlying suit by Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. (ARM) sought revocation of petitioners' tax 
exempt status because of the Conference's alleged electoral support of anti-abortion candidates. 
Given the nature of the suit, liberal justices were undoubtedly cross-pressured. Support for the 
Conference was a vote for the rights of litigants; support for ARM was a vote for abortion rights. 
25. The Chief Justice's votes favoring the federal entity moved from 90.1 percent in the 1986 
term to 61.8 percent in the 1987 term. 
26. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988); Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988); 
K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988); McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. 
Ct. 1677 (1988); E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988); United States 
Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606 (1988); Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 
(1988). 
27. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (accounting for two of the votes, 
see supra note 23 and accompanying text for further explanation); E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office 
Prod., 108 S. Ct. 1666 (1988) (opposing an employment discrimination claim); McLaughlin v. 
Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. 1677 (1988) (opposing civil enforcement of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act). 
28. Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537 (1988) (reversing a deportation order); United 
States Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606 (1988) (ordering disclosure under the Freedom 
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ambiguously so.29 This performance suggests a genuine if modest atti-
tudinal shift in favor of individual rights on the part of the Chief Jus-
tice during the 1987 term. 
Criminal Cases 
The two criminal case tables (3 and 4), as in the previous term, 
appear to reflect the same attitudes toward judicial restraint and indi-
vidual rights as do the tables for civil cases, but with voting somewhat 
more polarized at the extremes. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted 
only once to support a state criminal conviction,30 while Justice 
White31 and Chief Justice Rehnquist32 only twice supported the plea of 
a federal criminal defendant. In the state table all of the "unexpected" 
votes at the extremes occurred in unanimous (or non-dissenting) deci-
sions33 where, one may suppose, the law and the facts pointed over-
whelmingly in one direction.34 In the federal criminal case table no 
decision favoring the criminal defendant was unanimous (or without 
dissent),3~ and, indeed, all members of the Court but Justices Brennan 
and Marshall voted against the defendant in the large majority of cases. 
The Chief Justice favored the defendant only in a white collar bribe-
Of Information Act); and Webster v. Doe, 1008 S. Ct. 2047, (1988) (holding that the dismissal of 
a C.I.A. employee on grounds of homosexuality was reviewable). 
29. Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541, (1988). The Chief Justice voted with the majority 
in granting attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act but agreed that the district court's 
trebling of the $75.00 hourly rate was unjustified. Since two justices, White and O'Connor, see id. 
at 2559, were opposed to any attorney fee, the other six justices were treated as voting against the 
government. Justice Kennedy did not participate. 
30. Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988). 
31. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988); United States v. Providence Journal 
Co., 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988). 
32. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988); Mathews v. United States, 108 S. 
Ct. 883 (1988). 
33. Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988); Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 
(1988); Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988); Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792 
(1988); Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771; Yates v. Aiken, 108 S. Ct. 534 (1988). 
34. E.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988). This is the one state case in which 
Justices Marshall and Brennan voted to uphold conviction. The sole issue was whether police 
pursuit of a person who fled at the sight of an approaching patrol car constituted an impermissible 
fourth amendment seizure so as to preclude admission in evidence of packets containing drugs the 
suspect was observed to discard while in flight. All Justices agreed that the initial pursuit was not 
a "seizure." I d. 
35. The conviction in United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988), had been reversed 
by the Court of Appeals, United States v. Kozminski, 821 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987), and this was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. Justices Stevens and Blackmun concurred in the judgment but are 
coded as voting for the government because they disagreed with the majority on the only disputed 
issue, i.e., whether the lower court instructions on "involuntary servitude" were adequate. They 
concurred in the remand because of the need to rectify a trial court error not challenged on appeal 
by the government. 
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taking case86 and in an unusual case prosecuted for violation of a little 
used federal statute proscribing "involuntary servitude".37 At the bot-
tom end of the scale, Justice Marshall was on the side of the prosecu-
tion in just four cases. Two were unanimous decisions,38 one involved a 
white collar (non-underdog) defendant,89 and the fourth was a 
landmark separation of powers case in which the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the 1978 Ethics 
in Government Act, in the context of the prosecution of a former Rea-
gan Administration official.40 Justice Brennan supported the govern-
ment in the same four cases, as well as in one additional case of white 
collar crime. H Compared with the previous term, the ranking of the 
Justices is much the same in the criminal case tables. However, the 
polarization between the Justices is not quite as pronounced, primarily 
because the pro-government percentages are lower at the conservative 
end of the state scale and higher at the liberal end of the federal scale. 
If unanimity means easier cases, a portion of this diminished polariza-
tion may be explained by the greater number of cases decided without 
dissent during the 1987 term. The most notable change in voting be-
havior is Justice Blackmun's in the federal criminal cases table. He 
moved from seventh to third in support of the prosecution, which is an 
increase of 48.6 percentage points. Justice Kennedy is somewhat more 
prosecution-oriented on both tables than Justice Powell, whom he 
replaced. 
Individual Rights 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 deal with claims of constitutional and statutory 
rights. These show the same broad voting patterns as the tabulations 
based on governmental versus private parties. There are slight varia-
tions in the rankings, but Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun 
are in each instance at one extreme, with the Chief Justice, usually 
joined or closely followed by Justices White, O'Connor and Scalia, at 
the other. Justice Kennedy occupies a place in the rankings similar to 
that of Justice Powell in the preceding term and, except for equal pro-
tection (Table 6), has comparable voting percentages. With so few cases 
from which to draw any conclusions, Justice Kennedy's scores should 
36. Mathews v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 883 (1988). 
37. United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988). 
38. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. 
Ct. 1496 (1988). 
39. Doe v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988). 
40. Morrison v. Olson, JOB S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
41. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988). 
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be regarded as only a rough indication of his views on individual rights 
and judicial restraint. 
Table 5 best illustrates the wide spectrum of views on the Court, 
ranging from the 84.6% support of first amendment rights by Justices 
Brennan and Marshall to a mere 16.7% by the Chief Justice. As the 
figures in the right-hand column show, this pattern is consistent with 
the Court's voting behavior of the prior year. In the current term Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall failed to support the first amendment 
claim in only two of fourteen decisions, both of which were unanimous. 
In one of them, a claim of first amendment associational rights was 
rejected because it clashed with a New York City ordinance barring 
gender discrimination in club membership.'2 This was a matter of pre-
ferring one set of individual rights over another. The remaining in-
stance of failure to support a first amendment claim was a unanimous 
decision to uphold one provision of a District of Columbia ordinance 
designed to prevent picketing of foreign embassies.'3 However, the two 
justices joined the Court majority in striking down another provision of 
the same ordinance restricting the display of certain signs." At the 
other extreme, Justice Rehnquist's two votes in support of first amend-
ment claims also came in decisions without dissent.411 Justice O'Connor, 
joining the Chief Justice at the low end of the scale, endorsed one addi-
tional claim: the challenge to the embassy picketing ordinance. 46 
The rankings in Table 6 (equal protection) are much the same as 
in Table 5, although the percentages of votes in favor of these claims 
are uniformly lower. Blackmun, the highest ranked, supported only 
four47 of eight, and Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Scalia 
found only one meriting their support-a mother's attack on a Pennsyl-
vania statute placing a six year limitation upon the filing of a paternity 
action.48 That decision was unanimous. The Court was also unanimous 
in rejecting four of the eight equal protection claims,'9 while rejecting 
42. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988). 
43. Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). 
44. ld. The case is included twice in Table 5 because two distinct issues were decided by 
differing voting alignments. The case as a whole is classified in Table 1 as a decision against the 
government. 
45. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) ("actual malice" required for public 
figure to recover for emotional distress); Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988) (statute prohibit-
ing use of paid petition circulators invalidated). 
46. Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. at 1157. 
47. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); I.N.S. v. 
Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. at 1157; Pennell v. City of San 
Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988). 
48. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988). 
49. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988); I.N.S. v. 
Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. at 1157; Pennell v. City of San 
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three others by a divided vote. As indicated in the right-hand column, 
individual justices were somewhat more supportive of equal protection 
claims than during the previous term, but the Court as a whole rejected 
all but one of the claims in each term. 
Table 7 shows the Court to be more receptive to statutory civil 
rights claims than in the preceding term. Table 7 also shows that Court 
majorities were much more inclined to uphold claims based on federal 
statutes than claims based on constitutional guarantees of speech, reli-
gion and equal protection (Tables 5 and 6). The figures for statutory 
claims show more support for individual rights among all members of 
the Court, and particularly those at the bottom (conservative) end of 
the table. Two of the decisions favoring the claimant were unani-
mous,110 and another was decided without dissent on the merits, al-
though Justices Scalia and O'Connor objected on jurisdictional grounds 
without reaching the merits. 111 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun voted against the statutory claim only once in a case raising an 
issue of municipal liability for an alleged retaliatory personnel decision. 
Although they agreed with the Court that the acts complained of did 
not result from municipal policy, they joined a separate concurrence 
attributing broader liability to cities generally than might be inferred 
from the plurality opinion.112 
jurisdiction and justiciability Questions 
Table 8 also conforms in broad outline to our initial assumptions 
about judicial restraint and individual rights, with Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens most favorable to the exercise of ju-
risdiction and Justices Scalia, O'Connor and the Chief Justice least 
likely to proceed to the merits in a challenge to jurisdiction or jus-
ticiability. This stands in contrast to the 1986 term where the rankings 
were contrary to expectations. More jurisdictional issues appeared in 
the voting count this year (43 as compared with 28); but more issues 
were decided without dissent (29 as compared with 18). The differences 
in rankings are attributable to the 15 issues on which members of the 
Court differed, compared with 10 in 1986. Last year we explained the 
unexpected rankings by suggesting that the desire to achieve a particu-
Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988). 
50. West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988) (prison doctor acted "under color of state law"); 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988) (disparate impact analysis applied 
to subjective employment criteria under Title VII). 
51. Honig v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988) (upholding the statutory claims of handicapped 
student). 
52. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915, 928 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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lar substantive outcome may have affected the Justices' attitudes toward 
jurisdictional questions in several of the split decisions. 53 This year the 
effect of substance upon the jurisdictional decisions is not as readily 
apparent. Justice Brennan voted against exercise of jurisdiction only 
once when any member of the Court dissented;54 and Justice Scalia 
voted only twice to exercise jurisdiction when the decision was less than 
unanimous.55 If consistency on jurisdictional questions (when the issue 
is truly debatable) is a good criterion of judicial activism or restraint, 
Justice Scalia seems clearly to be the least activist Justice. 
Cases Raising Federalism Issues 
Table 9 presents a new category, not used in the summary of the 
1986 term, based on cases which raise an issue of conflict between state 
and federal government authority. We have labeled it "federalism." 
This category includes only those issues raised by conflict between na-
tional and state governmental instrumentalities, such as preemption, in-
tergovernmental taxation, application of the tenth amendment, or fed-
eral court interference with state court activities. It does not include 
cases in which the only conflict is alleged incompatibility of the state 
action with the United States Constitution. Nor does it include issues of 
interstate or "horizontal" federalism, as raised by the dormant com-
merce clause or the privileges and immunities clause. The federalism 
scale is intended to measure preference for federal government author-
ity, as opposed to state and local government authority. It excludes 
cases dealing with state-erected barriers to intercourse with other states, 
which appear to tap a different attitudinal dimension. 
In theory, the more conservative Justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor, 
Scalia-would tend to favor state authority, while Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Blackmun presumably would tend to support federal au-
thority. On its face Table 9 shows almost the opposite. Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall vote most often for state authority; Justices White, 
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy the least often; and Justices Rehnquist, 
Stevens and Blackman fall in the middle. We know, from their own 
announced positions on tenth amendment issues,56 that Table 9 does 
53. Riggs, supra note 1, at 25-26. 
54. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988) (Stevens, J. and Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting). 
55. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268 
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from an otherwise unanimous vote for jurisdiction); City of St. 
Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting from the otherwise unanimous 
vote for jurisdiction). 
56. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), 
in which Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and White, wrote an 
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not accurately reflect their views on the appropriate position of states 
within the federal system. 
The probable explanation of this anomaly lies in the specific sub-
ject matter of the disputes. Seven of the thirteen issues raised no ques-
tions close enough to call forth a dissent. 117 Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall cast "unexpected" votes (for the state) in four118 of the six119 split 
decisions, but three of the four are explicable by the "underdog" hy-
pothesis. A vote for the state was a vote, respectively, for utility rate-
payers against utility shareholders,60 for a workmen's compensation 
claim,61 and for liability of military suppliers to persons injured as a 
result of design defects in military equipment.62 Justices Brennan and 
Marshall both abandoned the underdog in Mackey v. Lanier Collec-
tions Agency & Service, Inc. 63 by concluding that the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) did not preempt a Georgia general 
garnishment statute. The practical effect was to permit judgment credi-
tor garnishment of employee vacation and holiday benefits. Justice 
Blackmun parted company with his two liberal brethren on this ques-
tion,64 but voted with them on every other federalism issue. 
The votes of the most conservative members (Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, Scalia) are less easily explained by apparent predispositions 
transcending the peculiar facts of a particular case, although their votes 
opinion overturning National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), thus eliminating the 
tenth amendment as a limitation upon the capacity of Congress acting under the commerce power 
to regulate state governmental activities. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor wrote vigorous dis-
sents. Justice Scalia has also indicated concern for preserving the role of the states. See, e.g., South 
Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 1369 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 
57. Ten of the thirteen dealt with preemption; six of these were without dissent, including 
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (Mackey raised two preemption issues, 
one decided unanimously, one by a divided Court); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 
S. Ct. 1877 (1988); City of New York v. F.C.C., 108 S. Ct. 1637 (1988); Puerto Rico Dep't of 
Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum, 108 S. Ct. 1350 (1988); Bennett v. Arkansas, 108 S. Ct. 1204 
(1988); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145 (1988). Non-unanimous preemption 
decisions included Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); Mississippi Power 
& Light Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988); Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988); and 
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency and Service, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988). The seventh 
unanimous decision, Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp, 108 S. Ct. 1684 (1988), did not involve 
preemption. 
58. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988); Mississippi Power & Light 
Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1 988); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 
2182 (1988); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 108 s. Ct. 1704 (1988). 
59. See cases cited supra note 58, and Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1 988); South Caro-
lina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988). 
60. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2428 ( 1988). 
61. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 1704 (1988). 
62. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988). 
63. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988). 
64. I d. at 2191 (Kennedy, J. dissenting, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia). 
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for preemption in heeding the pleas of Mississippi Power and Light 
Company and the military contractor65 might be interpreted as a pro-
business or vested-interests bias. In South Carolina v. Baker, 66 only 
Justice O'Connor found federal taxation of interest on state and local 
bonds unconstitutional.67 The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia agreed 
with Justice O'Connor that the tenth amendment was not a dead let-
ter,68 but they nevertheless voted to uphold the tax. The justices' re-
maining departures from the expected voting behavior must be ex-
plained by other factors, perhaps those peculiar to the facts and 
circumstances of a given case. 
Swing-Vote Analysis 
Table 10, also new this year, gives the number of times each jus-
tice voted with the majority in cases close enough to be decided by a 
single vote. In such cases, a shift of any one justice from the majority to 
the minority coalition would create a new majority and a different re-
sult. We call this "swing-vote" analysis because each member of the 
majority is in a position to swing the decision one way or the other 
(assuming, of course, that other votes remain constant), depending on 
how his or her vote is cast. Because each majority vote is crucial to the 
outcome, frequency of swing voting may be regarded as one index of 
influence on Court decision-making. 
The usual case of this type is the 5-4 decision, but other combina-
tions are possible. During the 1987 term, three cases were decided by a 
4-3 vote69 and, because the Senate was slow in approving a replacement 
for Justice Powell, twenty-two decisions were made by a vote of 5-3. 
Not all of the five-three decisions are included in Table 10 because the 
outcome in seven of them would not have been changed by the shift of a 
single justice from the majority to minority. In those cases the Court 
merely affirmed a lower court decision, and a switch of one vote would 
still have resulted in affirmance by an equally divided court.70 In all, a 
total of 31 decisions are included in Table 10. 
65. Mississippi Light & Power Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988). 
66. 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988). 
67. /d. at 1370 (O'Connor, ]. dissenting). 
68. /d. at 1369 (Scalia, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
69. Murray v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988); Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988). 
70. The seven cases were Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 
(1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988); United States Dep't. of Justice v. 
Julian, 108 S. Ct. 1606 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988); 
Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (1988); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988); 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988). 
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Not surprisingly, the high scorer is Justice White who voted with 
the majority in twenty-four of thirty-one close cases, which is 77.4% of 
the total. Justice White has perennially acted as a swing voter on the 
Court, not committed consistently to either a conservative or liberal 
course of action. In second place is Justice Kennedy who joined the 
majority in ten (71.4%) of the close cases in which he participated. 
Among other Justices the three conservatives (Rehnquist, O'Connor 
and Scalia) score higher than the three liberals (Brennan, Marshall 
and Blackmun), with Justice Stevens in a middle position. This pattern 
indicates that the swing vote of justices closer to the middle of the ideo-
logical spectrum is most often crucial, but overall the majorities come 
somewhat more from the right than from the left. This scale, of course, 
measures the voting of judges only in relation to each other; it provides 
no fixed or objective standard for determining how "conservative" or 
"liberal" the decisions of the Court may be. Tables 1 through 9 may 
shed some light on that subject. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As we observed last year,71 our discussion has highlighted some of 
the relationships appearing in patterns of Supreme Court voting, with-
out exhausting all credible interpretations of the data. The availability 
of information covering two terms adds an additional temporal dimen-
sion to the analysis this year, although no startling changes are evident. 
Comparison of the two terms shows some variation of rankings in indi-
vidual tables, as well as variation in percentages, but no large consistent 
shifts of any justice toward or away from judicial restraint or support 
of individual rights. Nor do the decisions of the Court as a whole indi-
cate significant shifts in one direction across all of the tables, or even 
most of them. Justice Kennedy seems to have had little effect on the 
orientation of the Court during the 1987 term. To the extent of his 
participation, his voting behavior is quite comparable to that of his 
predecessor Justice Powell (except, perhaps, for a somewhat tougher 
attitude toward criminal defendants). One may identify important deci-
sions in which Justice Kennedy's vote, or that of another Justice, made 
the critical difference; but no consistent trend away from last year's 
norm is evident for any member of the Court. 
The authors and the BYU JouRNAL OF PuBLIC LAW hope that 
this analysis, and particularly the voting data, will be useful to those 
interested in the work of the United States Supreme Court. We again 
71. Riggs, supra note 1, at 16, 21. 
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invite suggestions for the augmentation and improvement of subsequent 
surveys of Supreme Court voting.72 
72. The authors thank Professor Rex E. Lee for his suggestions dealing with Table 10. 
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V. APPENDIX 
A. Explanation of Criteria Governing Selection and Classification 
of Cases 
1. The Universe of cases 
Only cases decided during the 1987 Term by full opinion setting 
forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Cases handled 
by summary disposition or denial of certiorari, though accompanied by 
written dissents in some instances, are excluded as not being decided by 
written opinion. Cases decided by a four-four tie vote, hence resulting 
in affirmance without written opinion, are also excluded. Both signed 
opinions and per curiam opinions are included, however, if they set 
forth reasons in a more than perfunctory way. All such cases were 
read, but cases not fitting any of the nine categories are of course not 
included in the data base for any of the tables. 
2. Cases classified as civil or criminal 
Classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly ac-
cepted definitions; generally the nature of the case is clearly identified 
in the opinion. One case, Hicks v. Feiock, 108 S. Ct. 1423 (1988), 
raised a difficult problem of classification because the outcome of the 
case hinged on whether the contempt citation was found to be civil or 
criminal. Three members of the Court thought it was civil; five were 
unsure and remanded for a lower court determination. We classified it 
as criminal because the lower courts had previously acted on that as-
sumption without carefully addressing the issue. 
3. Classification by nature of the parties 
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental 
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true 
of the criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded if they do not satisfy this 
criterion. The governmental entity might be the government itself, one 
of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one of 
its political subdivisions. 
A suit against an official in his personal capacity is included if he 
is represented by government attorneys or the interests of the state are 
otherwise clearly implicated. In Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 
(1988), an Arizona official was named defendant along with several 
federal officials. The case was included in the federal-civil table but not 
the state-civil table because the Arizona official was treated as having 
liability only as an agent of the federal government and the suit was 
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defended by the United States Solicitor General, without participation 
of record by the Arizona Attorney General's office. 
In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if govern-
mental entities appear on both sides of the controversy. This rule was 
applied to exclude ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805 
(1988), because a companion case, Hodel v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct. 805 
(1988), litigating precisely the same issues, had federal and state gov-
ernment parties on opposite sides. 
4. Classification by nature of the issue 
A case is included in each category, Tables 5 through 9, if it raises 
a relevant issue that is addressed in the written opinion(s). One case 
may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is also included 
more than once in the same table if it raises two more distinct issues in 
that category and the issues are resolved by differing voting alignments. 
A case is not included for any issue which, though raised by one of the 
litigants, is not addressed in any opinion. 
Identification of first amendment and equal protection issues posed 
no special problem. In each instance the nature of the claim is expressly 
identified in the opinions. 
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are limited 
to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the civil rights statutes ap-
pearing in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988; and other federal statutes ex-
pressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national ori-
gin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based on 
a federal statute or on common law, or if the issue is the applicability 
of § 1983. Section 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right 
asserted is based on the United States Constitution and the applicability 
of § 1983 is not at issue. The purpose of the § 1983 exclusion is to 
preserve the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
claims. 
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not 
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability generally. Jurisdictional 
questions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no 
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court 
may comment on its jurisdiction. 
The federalism table (Table 9) is limited to issues raised by con-
flicting actions of federal and state or local governments. Common ex-
amples are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of 
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the tenth amendment as a limit on federal regulation of state instru-
mentalities, and federal court interference with state court activities. Is-
sues of "horizontal" federalism or interstate relationships, such as those 
raised by the dormant commerce clause or the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, are excluded from the table. 
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B. Cases Included in Statistical Tables* 
Table 1: Civil Cases: State I Local Government versus Private Party 
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 108 S. Ct. 2667 (1988). 
Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988). 
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988). 
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Moore, 108 S. Ct. 
2428 (1988). 
Florida v. Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354 (1988). 
Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302 (1988). 
Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988). 
West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988). 
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 
(1988). 
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 
(1988). 
Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988). 
New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988). 
Public Serv. Comm'n v. Martin Exploration & Mining Co., 108 S. Ct. 
1765 (1988). 
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 108 S. Ct. 1704 (1988). 
D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 108 S. Ct. 1619 (1988). 
Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 108 S. Ct. 
1444 (1988). 
Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 108 S. 
Ct. 1350 (1988). 
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 108 S. Ct. 1306 (1988). 
Bennett v. Arkansas, 108 S. Ct. 1204 (1988). 
Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). 
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 108 S. Ct. 1145 (1988). 
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988). 
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988). 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988). 
Honig v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988). 
Marino v. Ortiz; Costello v. New York City Police Dep't, 108 S. Ct. 
586 (1988) (companion cases). 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). 
Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988). 
Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S. Ct. 523 (1988). 
• Cases listed twice are those with more than one voting alignment within the category. 
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Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government versus Private Party 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988). 
Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988). 
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988). 
Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988). 
United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, 
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2268 (1988). 
I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 108 S. Ct. 2210 (1988). 
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